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Abstract
Political scientists since Anthony Downs (1957) have hypothesized that more policy in-
formation leads to a higher voter turnout. To empirically test this hypothesis, we conducted
an Internet-based randomized ﬁeld experiment during Japan’s 2004 Upper House election.
Japan’s 2004 election is ideal for testing our hypothesis because political parties prepared
formal “manifestos” that include proposals for major policy issues. We ﬁnd that voters are
less likely to abstain when they receive policy information about both ruling and opposition
parties through their oﬃcial party websites. The information eﬀects are larger among those
voters who were planning to vote but were undecided about which party to vote for. Our
ﬁndings also shed light on the role of the Internet as an important source of information for
voters.
Methodologically, this paper illustrates how to design and analyze Internet-based ran-
domized ﬁeld experiments, which are becoming increasingly common in the social sciences.
Our experimental approach avoids the problem of endogenous information acquisition, which
is inherent when using observational studies to estimate the causal eﬀects of information on
voting behavior. Furthermore, we employ a randomized block design to ensure eﬃcient
randomization, and apply a Bayesian statistical model to account for noncompliance and
nonresponse, the two prevailing problems of ﬁeld experiments.
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, political scientists have emphasized information as a key determinant of
voting behavior (e.g., Alvarez, 1998; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Ferejohn and Kuklinski,
1990; Grofman, 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). In An Economic
Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs (1957) ﬁrst theorized the eﬀects of information (or lack
thereof) on voter turnout, and this pioneering work inspired the studies of later scholars. In
particular, one of Downs’s main arguments – the less information a voter has, the more likely
he is to abstain – led to the development of various formal models that attempt to explain the
causal relationship between information and turnout (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999;
Ghirardato and Katz, 2002; Matsusaka, 1995; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985).
In this paper, we empirically test this information hypothesis through an Internet-based ran-
domized ﬁeld experiment we administered during Japan’s 2004 Upper House election. We ﬁnd
that voters are less likely to abstain when they receive policy information about both ruling and
opposition parties through their oﬃcial party websites. The information eﬀects are larger among
those voters who were planning to vote but were undecided about which party to vote for. Our
ﬁndings also shed light on the role of the Internet as an important source of information for voters.
The contributions of this paper are both substantive and methodological. First, our experiment
is one of few randomized ﬁeld experiments that directly estimates the causal eﬀect of policy
information on voter turnout. Our study also examines the role of the Internet as an important
source of information for voters by utilizing real policy information available through the oﬃcial
party websites. Japan’s 2004 Upper House election is not only ideal for testing our hypothesis
but also interesting in its own light. In particular, as a conscious eﬀort to move away from
personal politics, major political parties in Japan have recently begun to prepare “manifestos”
that explicitly state formal proposals for major policy issues. The ﬁndings of this paper bear
important policy implications on the inﬂuence of such policy proposals on the voting behavior of
the Japanese electorate.
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Secondly, our experimental approach avoids the problem of endogenous information acquisition
that is inherent when estimating the causal eﬀect of information on voting behavior in observational
studies. Speciﬁcally, those voters with a strong intention to vote may be more likely to acquire
policy information. By exposing randomly selected voters to exogenous information, we minimize
this potential bias. Furthermore, we illustrate how to design, conduct, and analyze Internet-based
randomized ﬁeld experiments, which are becoming increasingly common in the social sciences.1
In particular, we employ a randomized block design to ensure eﬃcient randomization. We then
apply a Bayesian statistical model to account for the two prevailing problems of ﬁeld experiments,
noncompliance and nonresponse. We hope that our methodological approach will serve as a
template for future randomized ﬁeld experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the existing theoretical
and empirical literature on information and voter turnout. In Section 3, we present the design of
our Internet-based randomized ﬁeld experiment. In Section 4, we describe our statistical methods
that can be used to analyze randomized ﬁeld experiments with noncompliance and nonresponse.
The results of our statistical analysis are shown and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Information and Voter Turnout
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between
information and voter turnout. We then explain motivations for our use of a randomized ﬁeld
experiment.
1For example, an NSF-funded project, Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), oﬀers re-
searchers opportunities to conduct Internet-based experiments. See http://www.experimentcentral.org
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2.1 Theoretical Studies
In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs (1957) ﬁrst theorized how information aﬀects
voters’ decision-making from a rational choice perspective. His model, which is later formalized
by Matsusaka (1995), assumes that a citizen has some preferences about a given policy issue, but is
uncertain as to whether a party of his choice is the “right” party that brings out the most desirable
policy outcomes.2 Thus, information increases voters’ conﬁdence in their choice by helping them
evaluate some objective characteristics of parties and their proposed policies.
The pioneering work of Downs has inspired many scholars who then developed formal models to
explain why information leads to a higher voter turnout. For example, Ghirardato and Katz (2002)
present a decision-theoretic model and show how the quality of information (i.e., “ambiguity”)
aﬀects a voter’s turnout decision. They demonstrate that a citizen abstains from voting when
candidates’ policy positions are ambiguous; i.e., when “One candidate looks better than the other
in some scenario he envisions, while the opposite happens in another scenario” (p. 3). Here,
information is shown to reduce a voter’s ambiguity about candidates and hence to increase the
probability of voting. Another recent example is the game-theoretic model of Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) which focuses on the asymmetric information across voters. The authors
show that uninformed voters, even when they prefer one policy over another, abstain from voting
and delegate their votes to other voters who are more informed and therefore are more likely to
make a correct policy choice.
Although the assumptions and logic of these formal models are diﬀerent, their basic implica-
tions have been largely consistent with Downs’s original conjecture – more policy information leads
to a higher voter turnout. Our study tests this essential hypothesis. However, in this paper, we
do not test the diﬀerent causal mechanisms derived from these formal models. Instead, we leave
that task for future research. This limitation arises in part because some of the causal variables
2For comprehensive reviews of the Downsian model of voter turnout, see Blais (2000), Feddersen (2004) and
Grofman (1983).
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are diﬃcult, if not impossible, to manipulate in a real election. For example, we must manipulate
parties’ policy positions (to test the Ghirardato–Katz model), vary the types and number of vot-
ers (to test the Feddersen–Pesendorfer model), and measure the levels of voters’ conﬁdence and
their subjective evaluations of party diﬀerentials (to test the Downs–Matsusaka model). Given
the diﬃculties of manipulating such factors in a real election, we decide to vary the amount of
policy information each voter receives and measure how it aﬀects a voter’s turnout decision. We
expose randomly selected voters to policy information through the use of oﬃcial party websites
right before the election.
2.2 Empirical Studies
While there exist many empirical studies that examine the relationships between information
and voter turnout, we believe that our experimental study makes unique contributions to the
literature. First, this is one of the few randomized ﬁeld experiments that directly estimates the
causal eﬀects of policy information on voter turnout in a real election (see Iyengar and Jackman,
2003; Wantchekon, 2003, for notable exceptions). Downs (1957) emphasized the importance of
policy information and argued that party policies determine party diﬀerential, which in turn
inﬂuences on voting behavior (p. 266). The formal models reviewed above also assume rational
voters who evaluate the policies of parties and candidates. Therefore, in order to examine the
empirical implications of these theoretical models, we estimate the causal eﬀect of information
about party policies on voter turnout.
Of course, as Downs himself observed, most citizens are not well-informed about policies.3 In-
deed, most of the the existing empirical literature shows that voters rely on various short cuts and
cues (Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1991, 1993). They include party labels (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960),
candidate characteristics (e.g., McDermott, 1997, 2005; Sigelman et al., 1995), past economic per-
formance (e.g., Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966), very recent experiences (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2004),
3Even before Downs, others made a similar point (see e.g., Berelson et al., 1954; Lippmann, 1922).
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media coverage and televised advertisement (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere
et al., 1994), and opinions of other voters (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). While the impor-
tance of these factors is almost indisputable, it neither denies the importance of policy information
nor precludes the need for empirically evaluating the impact of such information.
The second important feature of our experiment is the use of the Internet. In many democra-
cies, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, the Internet has become an important
source of information for voters and an essential tool for parties and candidates to reach voters
(e.g., Dulio et al., 1999; Gibson et al., 2003a,b). Accordingly, in Japan and elsewhere, facilitat-
ing and/or regulating information ﬂow from parties to voters via the Internet is the focus of an
important policy debate. Our study also contributes to the emerging literature which examines
the question of how the Internet aﬀects voters’ political attitudes, opinions, and behavior (e.g.,
Johnson and Kaye, 2003; Lupia and Philpot, Nd; Weber et al., 2003).
Finally, Japan is an interesting and important case when examining the causal eﬀect of policy
information. Recently, as an attempt to mobilize votes based on their policy proposals, major
Japanese political parties have begun to prepare “manifestos” that explicitly state their formal
policy proposals on major issues. Meanwhile, the recent decline in voter turnout is an often-
expressed concern in Japan (e.g., Horiuchi, 2002). How much do these manifestos attract voters
and revive their interests in politics? Does manifesto-based electioneering encourage voters to
cast their ballots based on party policies rather than on their personal connections to a partic-
ular candidate? These questions are particularly important in the context of Japanese politics
because Japan has recently undergone signiﬁcant electoral and political reforms in order to mini-
mize the inﬂuence of personal politics and to promote policy-based electoral campaigns and voter
participation.
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2.3 Use of a Randomized Field Experiment
To test the information hypothesis stated in Section 2.1, we designed and conducted an Internet-
based randomized ﬁeld experiment.4 While randomized ﬁeld experiments face ethical and practical
limitations, there is a major advantage when estimating the causal eﬀect of information on voter
turnout. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁeld experimental study allows us to manipulate the quantity and/or
quality of information each respondent receives during a real election. Survey researchers have
analyzed various questions that are designed to measure the amount of information voters possess.5
While this literature has yielded considerable insight about the possible association between voting
and information, they face a common methodological problem that hinders the estimation of the
causal eﬀect of information on voting behavior. That is, those voters who have a strong intention
to vote may be more likely to acquire the information. Our experimental approach is designed to
address this problem of endogenous information acquisition.
In our experiment, we employ a randomized block design to ensure eﬃcient randomization (e.g.,
Cox and Reid, 2000) and apply the Bayesian causal inference framework of Imbens and Rubin
(1997) to properly analyze randomized ﬁeld experiments even when some unavoidable problems
occur. Recent political scientists have seriously considered the above limitation of observational
studies and have conducted randomized experiments. They examined, for example, the eﬀects
of televised political advertisement and various canvassing techniques (e.g., Ansolabehere and
Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Gerber and Green, 2000).6 Although these studies present
4See Harrison and List (2004) for various deﬁnitions of ﬁeld experiment.
5These measures include factual test questions (e.g., Lupia, 1994), interviewers’ subjective evaluations of each
respondent’s level of information (e.g., Bartels, 1996), indirect proxies such as levels of education and involvement
in social activities (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone, 1980), and other information
indexes (e.g., Palfrey and Poole, 1987). See Luskin (1987) and Zaller (1992, pp.333–344) for comprehensive reviews.
6See Kinder and Palfrey (1993); McDermott (2002) for reviews of experimental studies in the political science
literature.
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a promising approach, even a well-designed experiment is not always free from complications,
especially when it is conducted outside of a laboratory setting (see e.g., Imai, 2005). In particular,
an experimenter cannot force everyone to answer all of the questions (i.e., nonresponse) and
to receive a randomly assigned treatment (i.e., noncompliance). Ignoring these complications
typically yields incorrect inferences.
Finally, our study builds on two existing studies and makes methodological improvements.
Lassen (2005) examines the impact of policy information on voter turnout using data from a
Copenhagen referendum on decentralization. His study is based on an observational study where
the treatment assignment (i.e., the selection of districts for a pilot project of decentralization) is as-
sumed to be nearly random.7 Wantchekon (2003) conducted a unique randomized ﬁeld experiment
in Benin to examine the eﬀect of campaigns with diﬀerent policy platforms on voting behavior
(but not on turnout). Both studies successfully show the utilities of experimental approaches
and address important substantive issues, yet they face a common methodological challenge. In
particular, while their unit of analysis is an individual, the unit of treatment assignment is a
group of individuals – villages in Wantchekon (2003) and districts in Lassen (2005). As a result,
researchers do not have information as to whether individuals actually received the information.
Such a mismatch between the units of analysis and the treatment requires additional assumptions
and statistical adjustment when estimating the causal eﬀect of the information on voting behavior
(see e.g., Frangakis et al., 2002).8 As in many other ﬁeld experiments, the studies also may suﬀer
from potential bias due to nonresponse. We design and analyze our experiment so as to minimize
these potential sources of bias.
7See Angrist (1990) and Ho and Imai (2004, 2005) for natural experiments where the treatments are actually
randomized.
8This common problem in ﬁeld and natural experiments has not been properly dealt with in political science
(see Imai, 2005).
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3 Experimental Design
In June and July of 2004, we conducted an experiment through a Japanese Internet survey ﬁrm,
Nikkei Research.9 Our experiment consisted of three separate surveys, as depicted in Figure 1; a
screening survey, a pre-election survey, and a post-election survey. In the following, we explain
the implementation of each survey and our experimental design in detail.
3.1 Screening Survey
Between June 24th and 29th, two weeks prior to the election, we conducted a screening survey
and asked 6,000 respondents to answer several questions about themselves and their vote intention
in the upcoming election.10 We collected the data on each respondent’s prefecture of residence,
age, gender, highest education completed, and party preference.11 In addition, we asked the
respondents whether they were planning to vote in the upcoming election (planning to vote, not
planning to vote, or undecided), and, if so, which party and candidate they were planning to
vote for, and how much conﬁdence they had in their plan (a four-point scale). Note that both
the Upper and Lower House elections in Japan adopt a combination of a plurality system and
a proportional representation system. The wording of our survey questions closely followed the
standard protocol from large-scale Japanese national surveys, such as those of the Japan Election
Study (JES) projects. Furthermore, the survey was designed so that respondents must answer all
9The company has the sampling pool of roughly 40,000 Internet users, throughout Japan, who have agreed
to receive occasional electronic mails asking them to participate in on-line surveys. Those who ﬁll out a survey
questionnaire have a chance to win a gift certiﬁcate in the amount of approximately ﬁve to ten dollars.
10We asked Nikkei Research to randomly select the equal number of male and female monitors, all of whom are
aged between 20 to 59. Note that in Japan, unlike in the United States, every eligible voter (20 years old and
above) is automatically registered.
11For party preference, we ﬁrst asked respondents to indicate whether they supported a particular party or a
candidate, and then asked to rate their support for each of the ﬁve major parties on a four-point scale.
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N=1,600 (Noncompliance N=425)
N= 40,000
Sampling Pool
Group
LDP/DPJ
(N=300) (N=300)
N= 400
Random Assignment
Screening Survey (June 24−29)
Pre−election Survey (July 5−9)
Random Sampling
N=6,000 (Respondents N=2,748)
Experimental Sample
N= 2,000
Group
Control Group
One−Party Treatment Two−Party Treatment
Post−election Survey (July 12−16)
N=2,000 (Nonresponse N=342)
DPJ/LDP
LDP(N=500)   DPJ(N=500)
Figure 1: The Experimental Design. The experiment uses three surveys. The screening survey
measures the pre-treatment covariates, and the pre-election survey administers the randomized
treatments. Finally, the post-election survey measures the outcome variable.
the questions in order to complete the survey.12
Out of 6,000 individuals who received an electronic mail asking them to ﬁll out the screening
survey, 2,748 individuals completed the survey. From this group, we then randomly selected
12Since the Internet survey ﬁrm does not produce sampling weights, we ignore the problem of unit nonresponse
here.
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2,000 eligible voters as our experimental sample.13 With a few exceptions of over-represented
urban prefectures, the comparison of the 2000 Census and our sample shows no clear evidence of
geographical sampling bias. Yet, as is the case for many other experimental studies, our sample
is not fully representative of the Japanese electorate. First, the individuals in our sample were
those who had Internet access, voluntarily registered themselves as a monitor for the survey
ﬁrm, and agreed to ﬁll out the screening survey. While the lack of representativeness (as well
as the unavailability of sampling weights) is a clear drawback for the use of the Internet survey
in our experiment, we note that from a policy perspective we are often interested in examining
the eﬀectiveness of a party website for Internet users. Second, our sample is likely to contain
active Internet users with some interest in politics. This means that, as seen later, the rates of
noncompliance and nonresponse are much lower than typical ﬁeld experiments. Although one
ideally wants a representative sample of a target population, the high response and compliance
rates bring their own advantages; our results rely less on statistical assumptions, than would be
possible with a representative sample. These issues reﬂect a usual trade-oﬀ between internal and
external validity in empirical research.14
3.2 Pre-election Survey
From July 5th to 9th, we administered the pre-election survey. The Upper House election was
held on July 11th, two days after the closing of the survey. Before sending an electronic mail
soliciting their participation in the survey, we randomly assigned the treatments to the voters
of our experimental sample. In particular, we considered two types of treatments and randomly
divided the sample into three groups, i.e., the two treatment groups and the control group. The
voters in the one-party treatment group were asked to visit the designated website of either the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), while those in the two-
13The sample size is reduced to 2,000 given the ﬁnancial constraint.
14Experimental studies typically gain internal validity at the cost of external validity of observational studies.
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Randomized blocks
I II III IV V VI
planning to vote not planning to vote undecided
male female male female male female Total
One-party treatment group
DPJ website 194 151 24 33 36 62 500
LDP website 194 151 24 33 36 62 500
Two-party treatment group
DPJ/LDP websites 117 91 15 20 20 37 300
LDP/DPJ websites 117 91 15 20 20 37 300
Control group
no website 156 121 19 26 29 49 400
Block size 778 605 97 132 141 247 2000
Table 1: Randomized Block Design of the Japanese Election Experiment: Six randomized blocks
were formed on the basis of the two covariates, gender (male or female) and the answer to the
question, “Are you going to vote in the upcoming election?” (“planning to vote”, “not planning
to vote”, or “undecided”). Within each block, the complete random assignment of the treatments
was conducted such that the size of each treatment and control group is equal to the predetermined
number, which is listed in the right column. The total sample size is 2,000.
party treatment group were asked to visit the websites of both parties.15 None of the individuals
in the control group were asked to participate in the pre-election survey. Our experimental design
with two diﬀerent treatment conditions allows us to examine not only whether exposure to policy
information inﬂuenced voter turnout, but also how diﬀerent levels of exposure aﬀected turnout.
In order to randomly divide the sample into the two treatment and control groups, we applied
a randomized block design as shown in Table 1. We formed six blocks on the basis of the gender
and voter intention variables, which we obtained from the screening survey. We chose the voter
15Many formal models assume two major parties (or candidates) competing in an election. Japan’s 2004 Upper
House election ﬁts such a two-party competition model fairly well, because in this election, most voters were
confronted with the choice to vote for the LDP, which has been in power since its foundation in 1955 (except during
a short period from 1993 to 1994), or for the DPJ, which is the largest opposition party formed by amalgamation
of various parties. In fact, in this election, 82 percent of seats were won by these two major parties. Other small
opposition parties (e.g., Japanese Communist Party), as well as a small ruling party (i.e., New Komeito¯), play
minor roles in government formation and policy implementation.
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intention variable because we thought it was an important predictor of voters’ turnout decision
and their compliance status.16 Within each of six randomized blocks, we conducted the complete
randomization of treatments such that the total number of voters is 1,000, 600, and 400 for the one-
party and two-party treatment groups, and the control group, respectively. Within the one-party
treatment group, a random half of the voters were instructed to visit the DPJ website, whereas
the other half was instructed to visit the LDP website. Similarly, for the two-party treatment
group, a random half of the voters were instructed to visit the DPJ website ﬁrst before visiting
the LDP website, while the order was reversed for the other half.
One advantage of a randomized block design over a simple randomization design is that it
reduces the observed and unobserved diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups and
thus yields more eﬃcient estimates (e.g., Cox and Reid, 2000).17 Table 4 in Appendix A illustrates
the overall balance of the observed covariates, showing that none of the t-statistics is signiﬁcant
at conventional levels. That is, there are only small diﬀerences between the treatment and control
groups in terms of the observed covariates including age, education, party preferences, etc. Finally,
with the randomized block design, we can estimate the causal eﬀects for each subgroup more
eﬃciently.
For both the LDP and DPJ, we used the oﬃcial website showing their party platform. Speciﬁ-
cally, we selected the particular section of the two parties’ oﬃcial “manifesto” that describes their
formal policy proposals on pension reform.18 Our focus on pension reform was motivated by the
fact that it was one of the two major issues in this election along with the government’s policy
16The deﬁnition of compliance will be fully discussed in Section 4.
17Other types of experimental designs with a similar idea include matched-pair design using optimal matching
(Greevy et al., 2004) and propensity score matching (Hill et al., 1999)
18In Japan, parties and candidates are not allowed to change the contents of their websites during a campaign
period. This regulation, though it may not be desirable from a normative perspective, is convenient for our
experimental study, as we need not consider the possibility that diﬀerent voters within the same treatment group
viewed diﬀerent web contents.
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towards Iraq.19 The LDP website presented their pension reform policies by explaining in detail
the legislation that had been passed in the Diet approximately one month before the election.
This legislation was widely considered to constitute a set of minor changes to the current pension
system. The LDP website gave little information about plans for further reforms, such as the
possible future integration of various pension systems which has been widely debated. It also did
not mention other unresolved and controversial issues.20 In contrast, at the very beginning of its
party manifesto, the DPJ emphasized the need for the national integration of pension systems
and proposed the abolishment of the special pension for Diet members. While the DPJ website
proposed major reforms, however, it did not specify the content of the reforms and did not explain
how such proposals would be implemented.
Before being instructed to visit the website in the pre-election survey, voters were presented
with a few brief questions about the pension reform. These were general questions that were
intended to prepare voters before being exposed to the policy information. A translation of
the complete questionnaire appears in Appendix B. After answering these questions, voters were
instructed to click a direct link which took them to the designated party website. The instructions
also included a friendly warning, which mentioned they would be asked about their opinions on
the website after visiting it. We designed the survey so that voters had to visit the website in
order to go to the next question. In addition, we also obtained information as to whether visitors
actually opened the designated website in their browser even when the voters decided not to go
to the next question. Finally, to complete the survey, voters were asked to answer several brief
19According to a poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun and the University of Tokyo, 53 percent of candidates and
61 percent of voters regarded pension reform as one of the most important issues in this election (Asahi Shimbun,
evening edition, June 24, 2004).
20These issues include the question of whether to abolish the special pension scheme available for Diet members,
the political scandal where many Diet members had not been paying for their national pension premiums, and the
politically sensitive question of whether to raise the consumption tax to pay for the ever increasing burden of the
pension system.
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questions about the website they had just visited. For those voters who were assigned to the
two party websites, the same set of questions was presented after they visited each website. At
the end of the survey, voters were also given a chance to freely write their opinions about the
website. Although ﬁlling in this open-ended question was optional, nearly 80 percent of those
who participated in the pre-election survey wrote some comments and/or opinions. The voters
indicated a high level of interest in the pension reform, the upcoming election, and/or the party
websites.
3.3 Post-election Survey
Finally, we conducted a post-election survey between July 12th and 16th to measure the outcome
variable for all 2,000 experimental subjects. We used the same questionnaire for everyone, asking
whether they had voted in the election. We kept the survey short in order to minimize the unit
nonresponse, and as a result, more than 80 percent of the respondents completed the survey. In
the next section, we demonstrate how to statistically adjust for this nonresponse problem when
estimating causal eﬀects in randomized ﬁeld experiments with noncompliance.
4 Statistical Method for Randomized Experiments
In this section, we present a statistical method that we use to estimate the causal eﬀect of policy
information on voter turnout. First, we describe the two main complications of our experiment,
noncompliance and nonresponse, which are absent in the ideal prototype of classical randomized
experiments, but nevertheless are common for non-laboratory experiments. Second, we describe
our Bayesian model that addresses these complications under certain assumptions. Finally, we
brieﬂy explain how to estimate the model and draw causal inferences.
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4.1 Randomized Experiments with Noncompliance and Nonresponse
In political science, experimenters often do not have full control over their human subjects and
hence are likely to face additional complications that call for statistical adjustments. In particular,
the problems of noncompliance and nonresponse frequently threaten the internal validity of non-
laboratory experiments. In the context of our experiment, some voters did not visit the designated
website even when they were instructed to do so (i.e., noncompliance). Moreover, a few voters
did not ﬁll out the post-election survey, and therefore, the outcome variables were not recoded
for them (i.e., nonresponse). Since these two problems typically do not occur at random, ignoring
them in estimation may severely bias causal inferences.
To analyze randomized experiments with noncompliance and nonresponse, we begin by describ-
ing the formal statistical framework of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) (see also Frangakis and
Rubin, 2002). Let Zi be the treatment assignment indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if voter
i is instructed to visit a party website and is equal to 0 otherwise. Next, let Ti represent the
(actual) treatment indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if voter i actually visits the website and
is equal to 0 otherwise. Following our experimental design, we conduct three separate analyses
with diﬀerent binary treatment variables. First, we examine the causal eﬀect of browsing one
party website and two party websites, separately. In addition, we also estimate the causal eﬀects
of visiting at least one party website for diﬀerent subgroups in the sample that we select on the
basis of observed covariates.
For each analysis, then Zi and Ti can be deﬁned accordingly. If a voter logged on to the pre-
election survey questionnaire website but did not visit the designated website, we set Ti = 0 for
the voter. There are 133 such individuals, 63 of which belong to the one-party treatment group.
This corresponds to about 10 percent of those voters who logged onto the survey website. In the
two-party treatment group, there are 18 voters who visited only one designated website and did not
complete the pre-election survey. We set Ti = 0 for these voters. However, everyone who visited the
two party websites completed the survey (i.e., no drop out after visiting both websites). Because
15
of the drop-outs, we conduct sensitivity analyses using three diﬀerent deﬁnitions of compliance
(logged on to the survey website, visited the party websites, and completed the survey). The
results do not appear to be sensitive to these deﬁnitions.21
The overall compliance rate (i.e., the proportion of those repondents in the sample who would
take the treatment only when they are assigned to one), as shown in Section 5, is about 70 percent,
which is quite high when compared to typical ﬁeld experiments.22 As we demonstrate below, a
high compliance rate is crucial for successful statistical analysis of randomized experiments. It
reduces the degree to which estimated causal eﬀects rely on model assumptions, which are often
diﬃcult to verify from observed data.
Finally, following Rubin (1974), we deﬁne two potential outcomes, Yi(1) ≡ Yi(Ti = 1) and
Yi(0) ≡ Yi(Ti = 0). Yi(1) is the outcome (i.e., a binary variable of turnout) observed for voter i if
the voter visited the designated website and Yi(0) is the outcome which would be observed if voter
i did not visit the website. This means we only observe Yi = TiYi(1) + (1 − Ti)Yi(0). Moreover,
there exists the nonresponse problem because some respondents did not ﬁll out the post-election
survey.23 To introduce a formal notation, let Ri represent the indicator variable which is equal to
1 if Yi is observed and equal to 0 if it is missing. In our data, there are 342 respondents among
2,000 individuals who did not ﬁll out the post-election survey (75 of them belong to the control
group, 113 of them are members of the one-party treatment group, and the others belong to the
two-party treatment group). The attrition rate is roughly equal across the treatment and control
groups.
21 Although it is possible to deﬁne a multi-value treatment and conduct appropriate analyses (see e.g., Imai and
van Dyk, 2004), we take a sensitivity analysis approach here for simplicity.
22For example, the compliance rate of Gerber and Green (2000)’s experiment is as low as 25 percent (Imai, 2005).
23Note that by our design of the screening survey, we do not have any missing data for the covariates.
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4.2 Deﬁning Causal Eﬀects
Given this setup, we deﬁne the causal eﬀect of policy information on turnout for voter i as the
diﬀerence between the two potential outcomes: Yi(1)− Yi(0).24 A fundamental problem of causal
inference is that we can observe only one of the two potential outcomes, while the calculation of a
causal eﬀect requires both of them (Holland, 1986). Furthermore, two assumptions are implicit in
this formulation. First, we assume no interference among units (Cox, 1958; Rubin, 1990). That
is, for all i = j, we assume that voter i’s treatment assignment status, Zi, does not aﬀect voter j’s
treatment status, Tj, and that the potential outcomes for voter j, Yj(1) and Yj(0), are not aﬀected
by the treatment status of voter i, Ti, or her treatment assignment status, Zi. In our experiment,
this assumption seems reasonable because the voters in our sample are unlikely to communicate
with each other about the experiment.25
Second, we assume no direct eﬀect of treatment assignment. That is, for voter i, the treatment
assignment status Zi is assumed to aﬀect the voter’s potential outcomes, Yi(1) and Yi(0), only
through the actual treatment status, Ti.
26 In our experiment, the assumption would be violated
if a respondent changes her decision to vote or abstain because she was instructed to visit a party
website even though she did not actually complete the pre-election survey. This scenario is a
potential concern for 113 voters who logged onto the pre-election survey but did not complete it.
Therefore, we conducted sensitivity analyses by applying various deﬁnitions of compliance. The
results support the main conclusion of this paper.
Finally, we deﬁne two types of individuals in our experiment – compliers and noncompliers.
Compliers refer to the voters who visit the designated party website only when instructed to do
24Other causal eﬀects such as Yi(1)/Yi(0) are also possible.
25We emphasize that this assumption is often implicitly invoked. In principle, one can relax the assumption by
directly modeling the dependence between the potential outcomes of voter i and the treatment status of voter j.
Doing so, however, signiﬁcantly complicates the analysis and requires additional assumptions.
26In the literature, this assumption is called exclusion restriction.
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Treatment Assignment
Zi = 1 Zi = 0
Complier
Ti = 1 Yi(1) is observed; Ci = 1
Actual
Treatment
Noncomplier Complier or Noncomplier
Ti = 0 Yi(0) is observed; Ci = 0 Yi(0) is observed; Ci =??
Figure 2: Compliers and Noncompliers in the Japanese Election Experiment. The ﬁgure classiﬁes
compliers and noncompliers by treatment assignment, Zi, and actual treatment, Ti. We assume
that noncompliers solely consist of never-takers. From the observed data, Zi and Ti, one can
identify compliers and noncompliers all but in one case where Zi = Ti = 0. The upper right cell
is empty because we assume that always-takers and deﬁers do not exist in this experiment.
so (i.e., (Ti = 1, Zi = 1) and (Ti = 0, Zi = 0)), while noncompliers are those who do not follow the
instructions. There are three types of noncompliers (Angrist et al., 1996); always-takers, who do
visit the party website regardless of whether they are instructed to do so (i.e., (Ti = 1, Zi = 1) and
(Ti = 1, Zi = 0)), never-takers, who do not visit the party website regardless of the instruction
(i.e., (Ti = 0, Zi = 0) and (Ti = 0, Zi = 1)), and deﬁers, who visit the website only when they
are not instructed to do so (i.e., (Ti = 1, Zi = 0) and (Ti = 0, Zi = 1)). We use Ci as the
complier indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if respondent i is a complier and equal to 0 if he is
a noncomplier. In our analysis, we assume that there are neither always-takers nor deﬁers. This
assumption seems reasonable in our experiment.
Figure 2 summarizes our assumption about the types of noncompliers. It shows that from
the observed data, i.e., treatment assignment Zi and actual treatment Ti, we can identify the
compliance status of the voters in the treatment group (the left column of the ﬁgure). However,
for the voters in the control group (the lower right cell of Figure 2), we need to infer their
compliance status using the observed compliance pattern of the treatment group. As we shall see
below, randomization of treatment assignment makes such inference possible because it guarantees
that voters in the control group are similar in their observed and unobserved characteristics.
Our quantities of interest can be deﬁned separately for these two types of voters (Angrist
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et al., 1996). By deﬁnition, noncompliers never receive the treatment and so their treatment eﬀect
cannot be inferred from the observed data. Therefore, we may focus on the causal eﬀect of the
treatment for compliers who are in the upper left and lower right cells of Figure 2. The estimand,
the sample complier average causal eﬀect (CACE)27, is deﬁned as,
CACE =
∑N
i=1 Ci [Yi(1)− Yi(0)]∑N
i=1 Ci
. (1)
In our experiment, CACE deﬁnes the causal eﬀect of policy information on voting behavior
for those who would visit the website if they are told to do so. It is important to note that CACE
does not equal the usual sample average treatment eﬀect, ATE = 1
N
∑N
i=1 [Yi(1)− Yi(0)], which is
the causal eﬀect for the entire sample. From the perspective of policymakers who want to increase
voter turnout by using the Internet, CACE might be of greater interest than ATE because political
parties can not force every voter to visit their party website. Hence, it is important to estimate the
causal eﬀect for those voters who are likely to be exposed to policy information via the Internet.
Another quantity of interest is the intention-to-treat eﬀect, which represents the average causal
eﬀect of treatment assignment, Zi, rather than the actual treatment, Ti. In our experiment, this
is the causal eﬀect of being asked to visit the party website rather than the eﬀect of actually
visiting the website. Unlike CACE, ITT eﬀect does not directly correspond to the eﬀect of actual
treatment. However, it represents the eﬀectiveness of the treatment assignment for the whole
sample, rather than for a subsample. Despite this important diﬀerence, CACE and ITT eﬀect are
closely related because CACE represents ITT eﬀect for compliers (this follows from the deﬁnition
of compliers). Furthermore, ITT eﬀect (for the whole sample) is the weighted average of ITT
eﬀect for compliers and noncompliers. As a result, ITT eﬀect equals CACE multiplied by the
fraction of compliers in the sample,
∑N
i=1 Ci/N . The relationship implies that a low compliance
probability leads to a larger diﬀerence between CACE and ITT eﬀect.
27Another estimand of interest is its population counterpart (see Imbens, 2004)
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4.3 Model, Estimation, and Inference
We now describe our model based on the assumptions explicitly stated above. In particular, we
adopt the Bayesian causal inference framework of Imbens and Rubin (1997) because as demon-
strated by Barnard et al. (2003) and others, this framework allows one to deal with noncompliance
and nonresponse in a relatively straightforward manner (see also Hirano et al., 2000; Frangakis
et al., 2002). Particularly, we apply the modeling approach of Barnard et al. (2003) to our exper-
iment.
Our model consists of two parts. First, we specify the conditional probability of being a
complier given each voter’s observed covariates, i.e., Pr(Ci = 1 | Xi). Note that the compliance
status is unknown for the voters in the control group. Thus, their compliance status will be
imputed based on the model and covariates. We use the following binary probit model with the
latent variable Ui,
Ci = 1 if Ui > 0 where Ui ∼ N
(
δk + X

i ξ, 1
)
, (2)
where δk is the intercept speciﬁc to each of the randomized blocks k = 1, . . . , 6, and ξ is the
vector of coeﬃcients. From this model, one can estimate the fraction of compliers in the sample,
∑N
i=1 Ci/N , by imputing the unknown compliance status for the voters in the control group.
Next, we model turnout given the compliance status, the treatment status, Ti, and the observed
covariates, Xi, i.e., Pr(Yi = 1 |Ci = c, Ti = t,Xi) for t =0 or 1. Again, we use the binary probit
model deﬁned via the latent variable, Wi,
Yi = 1 if Wi > 0 where Wi ∼ N
[
αk + Ci {β0Ti + β1(1− Ti)}+ Xi γ, 1
]
. (3)
where β0 and β1 are the intercepts speciﬁc to compliers with and without the treatment, respec-
tively. The base category is noncompliers.
Finally, the two parts of the model in equations 2 and 3 are combined to form the following
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complete-data likelihood function,
N∏
i=1
[
Φ
(
δk + X

i ξ
)
Φ
(
αk + β0Ti + β1(1− Ti) + Xi γ
)Yi
× {1− Φ (αk + β0Ti + β1(1− Ti) + Xi γ
)}1−Yi ]Ci
×
[{
1− Φ (δk + Xi ξ
)}
Φ
(
αk + X

i γ
)Yi {
1− Φ (αk + Xi γ
)}1−Yi]1−Ci
, (4)
where Φ is the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution (see also
Hirano et al., 2000). We cannot directly evaluate this likelihood because the compliance status is
not observed for the voters in the control group. Therefore, we use the Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm described below, to conduct a Bayesian analysis.
In our experiment, approximately 17 percent of the voters did not ﬁll out the post-election
survey. For those voters, the values of the outcome variables are missing. However, deleting the
observations with nonresponses may severely bias our causal inferences (e.g., Frangakis and Rubin,
1999). We deal with the nonresponse problem by modeling the missing data mechanism concerning
the outcome variable, Yi. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the pattern of missing data is conditionally
independent of potential outcomes given the compliance status, the treatment status, and the
observed covariates, i.e., Ri ⊥ Yi(0), Yi(1) | Ci, Ti, Xi where ⊥ denotes the independence.28 That
is, by using Ci, Ti, and Xi, we predict the missing values of the outcome variable via the model
speciﬁed in equation 3. In our experiment, Xi includes many of the basic predictors of voting
behavior among Japanese voters. Therefore, this assumption seems quite reasonable.
To complete our model in the Bayesian framework, we assign two independent conjugate prior
distributions on (α, α1, α0, β) and (δ, γ), both of which are multivariate Normal distributions.
We then sample from the joint posterior distribution via a MCMC algorithm; we sample iter-
atively from p(Cmisi | δk, ξ, αk, β0, β1, γ, Ti, Xi, Zi), p(Ui | δk, ξ, Ci, Xi), p(δk, ξ | Xi, Ui), p(Y misi |
αk, β0, β1, γ, Ci, Ti, Xi), p(Wi | αk, β0, β1, γ, Ci, Ti, Xi, Yi) and p(αk, β0, β1, γ | Ci, Ti, Xi,Wi) where
28This assumption is called latent ignorability because the missing mechanism depends on the partially observed
variable, Ci (Frangakis and Rubin, 1999).
21
Cmisi and Y
mis
i represent the missing values of compliance status and outcome variable. The usual
calculation shows that all the conditional distributions are standard. In our implementation, we
use the marginal data augmentation algorithm of Imai and van Dyk (2005) to exploit the latent
variable structure and speed up the convergence. Our inference is based on 50,000 draws after
discarding the initial 10,000 draws. We use independent diﬀuse prior distributions; i.e., Normal
distribution with mean zero and variance 100. The MCMC algorithm produces the posterior draws
for the unobserved compliance status and the missing values of the outcome variable, as well as
the model parameters. Given these posterior draws, the average causal eﬀect and its uncertainty
estimate can be calculated. The Gibbs sampling algorithm is implemented by our own C code,
which we make publicly available with an easy-to-use R interface.
5 Estimated Causal Eﬀects of Policy Information
In this section, we present the results of our statistical analysis. Our main ﬁnding is that voters
are less likely to abstain when they receive policy information about both ruling and opposition
parties through their oﬃcial party websites. Moreover, the information eﬀects are larger among
those voters who were planning to vote but were undecided about which party to vote for.
First, Table 2 compares the causal eﬀect of one-party treatment with that of two-party treat-
ment by presenting the posterior summaries of quantities of interest; ITT eﬀect, CACE, proportion
of compliers in the sample. Also, the estimated turnout rates for the control group are shown sep-
arately for compliers, noncompliers, and the entire sample. They serve as the baseline turnout
of no exposure to the designated party websites.29 The estimated baseline turnout rate is about
70 percent, which is almost 15 percentage points higher than the oﬃcial turnout rate of the 2004
Upper House election. This gap arises in part because our sample is not representative of the
29These turnout rates for the control group are estimates because we do not observe the outcome variable for
some voters and the compliance status is unknown for every voter in the control group.
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Summary of Posterior Distributions
mean s.d. 2.5% 97.5%
One-party Treatment
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) Eﬀect 0.008 0.022 −0.034 0.052
Complier Average Causal Eﬀect (CACE) 0.011 0.029 −0.045 0.069
Fraction of Compliers 0.751 0.007 0.736 0.764
Turnout for the Control Group
Compliers 0.706 0.023 0.661 0.752
Noncompliers 0.675 0.057 0.559 0.783
All 0.698 0.009 0.680 0.715
Two-party Treatment
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) Eﬀect 0.031 0.022 −0.013 0.074
Complier Average Causal Eﬀect (CACE) 0.044 0.032 −0.019 0.106
Fraction of Compliers 0.704 0.012 0.681 0.726
Turnout for the Control Group
Compliers 0.685 0.026 0.634 0.738
Noncompliers 0.727 0.053 0.617 0.825
All 0.697 0.009 0.680 0.715
Table 2: Estimated Causal Eﬀects of Policy Information on Voter Turnout for One-party and
Two-party Treatments. The ﬁgures represent the numerical summaries of posterior distributions
for each quantity of interest separately for the one-party treatment and two-party treatment
conditions: standard deviation, and 95 percent credible interval. The estimated turnout rates for
the control group are shown separately for compliers, noncompliers, and the entire sample, as the
baseline turnout of no exposure to the designated party websites.
Japanese electorate. It is also possible that self-reported turnout is biased (e.g., Burden, 2000;
Campbell et al., 1960; Silver et al., 1986). The magnitude of such self-reporting bias is minimal,
however, unless the degree of mis-reporting is aﬀected by the actual treatment or the treatment
assignment. Finally, the estimated model parameters for the two-party treatment eﬀect appear in
Appendix C.
As expected from the hypothesis, the posterior means of CACE and ITT eﬀects estimates
are all positive. The causal eﬀects of one-party treatment are small and there is relatively large
uncertainty. The probability of voting increases (from 70.6 percent) by only 1.1 percentage points
on average among those voters who actually visited one party website (CACE), and the increase
is on average less than one percentage point (from 69.8 percent) for those who were asked to visit
one website (ITT eﬀect). Since the estimated proportion of compliers is considerably high (75.1
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Figure 3: Histograms of Posterior Simulation Draws for the Estimated Complier Average Causal
Eﬀects (CACE) on Turnout. The left panel compares the one-party treatment eﬀect (shaded
histogram) with the two-party treatment eﬀect (unshaded histogram). The middle panel compares
CACE using two subgroups – those voters who were planning to vote (unshaded) and those who
were not (shaded). The right panel compares the causal eﬀects for another set of two subgroups –
those who knew which party to vote for (shaded) and those who did not (unshaded). The vertical
lines represent the zero causa eﬀect.
percent in the one-party treatment and 70.4 percent in the two-party treatment), the estimated
ITT eﬀects and CACE are somewhat similar in our study. Large posterior standard deviations
mean that one cannot statistically distinguish these small positive estimates from zero.
In contrast, the causal eﬀects of the two-party treatment are stronger. The turnout probability
increases (from 69.7 percent) by 3.1 percentage points on average if a voter is asked to visit the
websites of both LDP and DPJ. The causal eﬀect among compliers is even larger, showing that
those who actually visited the two party websites were on average 4.4 percentage points more likely
to vote than those who did not.30 Although the 95 percent Bayesian credible intervals include zero
for both ITT eﬀect and CACE, approximately 91 percent of posterior draws take positive values.
This suggests that exposing voters to the policy information of both parties has a positive eﬀect
30If we also regard those voters who have logged on the pre-election survey as compliers, the estimated eﬀect is
slightly smaller. For the two-party treatment eﬀect, for example, we estimate 2.7 percentage points for ITT eﬀect
(standard deviation 2.8) and 3.5 percentage points for CACE (standard deviation 3.5) on average.
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on their turnout. The left panel of Figure 3 presents the histograms of posterior simulation draws
for one-party and two-party treatments, graphically illustrating the diﬀerence between the two.
Our ﬁndings oﬀer support for the hypothesis that policy information increases voter turnout,
in particular, when being exposed to the policy information of both ruling and opposition parties
(as opposed to that of just one party). One possible interpretation is that voters can only improve
their understandings of policy diﬀerences of the two parties whey they compare policy proposals.
Finally, we examine whether the size of causal eﬀects diﬀers across certain types of voters.
Using some of the pre-treatment variables measured in the screening survey, we analyze diﬀerent
subgroups related to vote intention. Table 3 presents the results of this analysis for four subgroups
of interest. Because of the limited sample sizes, we estimate the eﬀect of visiting at least one party’s
website by pooling the one-party and two-party treatment groups. First, we compare those voters
who said they were planning to vote with those who said they were undecided or not planning to
vote, based on one of the pre-treatment variables used to deﬁne randomized blocks.31 The results
indicate that visiting the designated website increases turnout by 3.5 percentage points (from 86.0
percent) on average among those who said they were planning to vote. On the other hand, there is
very little eﬀect on those who said they were undecided or not planning to vote. While the small
sample size makes the ﬁnding somewhat inconclusive, our treatment had little eﬀect for those who
did not have a strong intention to vote in the ﬁrst place. However, we regard the eﬀect size quite
large for those voters who were planning to vote given that the baseline turnout without exposure
to the party websites is estimated to be greater than 85 percent. The middle panel of Figure 3
shows the histograms of posterior distributions of CACE for the two subgroups. Approximately
88 percent of posterior draws take positive values for the subgroup of those who said they were
planning to vote.
We also compare the group of voters who knew which party to vote for with that of those
31We pool those voters who were undecided and those who were not planning to vote because of limited sample
sizes for these two groups.
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Summary of Posterior Distributions
mean s.d. 2.5% 97.5%
Planning to Vote
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) Eﬀect 0.026 0.023 −0.017 0.073
Complier Average Causal Eﬀect (CACE) 0.035 0.031 −0.023 0.097
Fraction of Compliers 0.750 0.006 0.738 0.761
Turnout for the Control Group
Compliers 0.860 0.021 0.819 0.903
Noncompliers 0.852 0.051 0.743 0.942
All 0.858 0.009 0.838 0.874
Undecided / Not Planning to Vote
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) Eﬀect 0.007 0.050 −0.094 0.103
Complier Average Causal Eﬀect (CACE) 0.011 0.072 −0.136 0.149
Fraction of Compliers 0.694 0.009 0.674 0.712
Turnout for the Control Group
Compliers 0.311 0.057 0.197 0.423
Noncompliers 0.373 0.091 0.200 0.556
All 0.331 0.022 0.293 0.374
Knew which Party to Vote For
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) Eﬀect −0.021 0.025 −0.065 0.032
Complier Average Causal Eﬀect (CACE) −0.027 0.032 −0.085 0.042
Fraction of Compliers 0.769 0.008 0.753 0.783
Turnout for the Control Group
Compliers 0.926 0.024 0.882 0.972
Noncompliers 0.897 0.061 0.769 1.000
All 0.919 0.010 0.897 0.938
Didn’t Know which Party to Vote For
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) Eﬀect 0.041 0.030 −0.018 0.100
Complier Average Causal Eﬀect (CACE) 0.057 0.042 −0.025 0.141
Fraction of Compliers 0.713 0.006 0.700 0.725
Turnout for the Control Group
Compliers 0.556 0.033 0.492 0.620
Noncompliers 0.604 0.065 0.476 0.728
All 0.570 0.013 0.543 0.594
Table 3: Vote Intention and Estimated Causal Eﬀects of Policy Information on Voter Turnout. The
ﬁgures represent the numerical summaries of posterior distributions for each quantity of interest
separately for the one-party treatment and two-party treatment conditions: standard deviation,
and 95 percent credible interval. The estimated turnout rates for the control group within each
subsample are shown separately for compliers, noncompliers, and the entire subsample, as the
baseline turnout of no exposure to the designated party websites.
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who did not two weeks prior to the election. The results show that visiting the designated party
websites had a slightly negative eﬀect on the former group. In fact, 80 percent of posterior draws
for CACE take negative values. In contrast, the policy information raises turnout by 5.7 percentage
points on average among those who did know know which party to vote for. Again, although a
relatively large posterior standard deviation prevents us from drawing a deﬁnitive conclusion, the
right panel of Figure 3 show that 91 percent of posterior draws exceeds zero for this subgroup.
While the sample of our experiment is too small to conduct a direct test and draw a deﬁnitive
conclusion, the independent analyses of these subgroups suggest that policy information may have
a positive impact on the turnout of those who are willing to vote and yet are undecided about
which party to vote for.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we empirically tested the information hypothesis that the more information vot-
ers receive, the more likely they are to vote. We designed an Internet-based randomized ﬁeld
experiment during Japan’s 2004 Upper House election and estimated the causal eﬀects of policy
information on voter turnout. The results oﬀer support for the information hypothesis. We found
that viewing the manifestos of both ruling and opposition parties through their oﬃcial party web-
sites increases voter turnout by more than four percentage points on average. We also found some
suggestive evidence that the size of information eﬀects varies with voters’ party preference and
vote intention.
These ﬁndings bear important implications. First, political scientists since Downs have shown
that voters are typically uninformed and hence use short cuts and cues, rather than policy infor-
mation, when making their voting decisions. However, we found that policy information inﬂuences
decision making of voters especially when voters are willing to vote but have not decided which
party to vote for. Second, our ﬁndings suggest that oﬃcial party websites and the Internet in gen-
eral may provide an important source of information for voters and an essential tool for political
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parties to reach potential voters. In the context of Japanese politics, we found that manifesto-based
and policy-oriented electioneering does inﬂuence voting behavior. Thus, more active campaigning
and policy discussion via the Internet have the potential to increase voter participation in the
future.
We believe that there are a variety of possibilities for further research on the causal relationship
between information and voting behavior. Given our main ﬁnding that more information leads to
a higher turnout, future research might investigate why and how information increases turnout.
Existing studies in the literature suggest a number of possible causal mechanisms. Information may
aﬀect voters’ behavior through diﬀerent factors such as partisanship, perceived party diﬀerentials,
conﬁdence in vote choice, and political sophistication (e.g. Brody and Page, 1972; Conover and
Feldman, 1989; Krosnick, 1988; Markus and Converse, 1979; Merrill et al., 2001; RePass, 1971;
Sniderman et al., 1982). While we found that policy information received right before the election
inﬂuenced voting behavior, it is also possible that information given earlier during campaign
periods aﬀect voters’ decision making in diﬀerent ways.
Finally, we demonstrated that randomized ﬁeld experiments can be used to eﬀectively test the
information hypothesis by avoiding the endogenous information acquisition problem that is com-
mon in the analysis of social surveys. Randomized block designs as well as other similar methods
(e.g., matched-pair designs) can ensure eﬃcient randomization. Our Bayesian statistical method
overcomes non-compliance and non-response problems, which are frequently encountered in ﬁeld
experiments. We were able to enhance the validity of the statistical assumptions about possible
nonresponse and noncompliance by measuring a number of important pre-treatment covariates
through the screening survey and by minimizing the number of non-compliers. We hope that this
paper serves as a methodological template for future empirical inquiry on the causal relationship
between information and voting.
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Appendices
A Balance of Observed Covariates After Randomization
The ﬁgures in Table 4 represent t-statistics testing mean diﬀerences for each pretreatment variable
across six randomized blocks. Each of the four columns shows the overall balance of the variables
separately for each treatment group compared with the control group. No t-statistic indicates
statistically signiﬁcant mean diﬀerences at 0.05 level, implying that the pretreatment variables
are well balanced for all treatment assignments.
B Pre-election Survey
We prepared diﬀerent sets of questionnaires for two treatment groups. The voters in the one-
party treatment group were asked to visit the designated website of either the LDP or the DPJ.
Those in the two-party treatment group were asked to visit the websites of both parties (the LDP
website before visiting the DPJ website or the DPJ website before the LDP website). Below, we
only show the questionnaire for the one-party treatment group using the LDP website. The other
questionnaires are almost identical except that Screens C and D are repeated for the two-party
treatment group.
Screen A Please answer questions starting from the one below: Do you agree, partially agree,
partially disagree or disagree with each of the following items? Please select the response
that best reﬂects your position. (Please select one only)
• I am interested in the current developments in pension reforms.
• Recently, I have had negative feelings towards people who avoid paying national pension
premiums.
• The national pension system needs to be fundamentally reformed.
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• The positions on national pension reforms are considerably diﬀerent between ruling
parties and opposition parties.
• When voting in the recent Upper House Election, I will take into consideration of each
party’s pension policy.
Screen B In the upcoming Upper House Election, each party’s pension reform proposal receives
much attention. We would like you to ﬁrst read the Liberal Democratic Party’s reform
plan published in their website, and then express your thoughts using questions such as
“Are the explanations on reform proposals easy to understand?”, “What is your perception
on the ‘readiness’ of the system to carry out reforms?”, and “Do the proposals take into
consideration the positions of various people?”.
Screen C We now ask you to take a look at the Liberal Democratic Party’s proposal.
1. If you click on the button below, the Liberal Democratic Party’s website pops up [in a
diﬀerent window].
2. If you scroll down the page, you will see a passage titled “To put the pension system
on a ﬁrmer basis” (about 1 page). Please read this passage carefully.
3. When you ﬁnish reading, click on the “to questions” button at the bottom of this page
and continue onto the next page. (If you do not open the Liberal Democratic Party’s
website, you cannot open the question page.)
Screen D We would like to ask for your thoughts on the Liberal Democratic Party’s website and
the party’s pension reform proposal. (If you want to browse the Liberal Democratic Party’s
website one more time, please click here.) Do you agree, partially agree, partially disagree
or disagree with each of the following items? Please select the response that best reﬂects
your position. (Please select one only)
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• I thought the explanations regarding the pension reform proposal were easy to under-
stand.
• I received the impression that the proposal is fairly drastic.
• I could perceive the political party’s preparedness and responsibility towards the pen-
sion reform.
• There seemed to be support to unify pensions from people of various occupations.
• I thought that adequate measures were formulated to address the ﬁnancial aspect of
the pension system.
• I thought the proposed pension system would take into consideration women and those
who have been injured.
Screen E Lastly, please write your own opinions about the pension reform and the party websites
that convey these reform proposals. (Please make speciﬁc points, and do not use hankaku
katakana.)
C Estimated Model Parameters
Table 5 shows the posterior summaries for each of the estimated parameters of compliance and
outcome models in our Bayesian model with the two-party treatment. The covariates used in
the estimation include each respondent’s age, whether her highest education completed is college
or above, whether she knew which party to vote for in the 2004 Upper House election (4 point
scale), and whether she thought the LDP, New Ko¯meito¯, JCP (Japan Communist Party), or SDP
(Social Democratic Party) was her preferred party (4 point scale). These variables are taken from
the screening survey. We also added the aggregate voter turnout rate in the prefecture of the
respondent’s residence in the previous Upper House election in 2001.
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One party treatment Two party treatment
LDP DPJ LDP/DPJ DPJ/LDP
Age −0.27 0.09 −0.97 −1.11
Age2 −0.19 0.09 −0.89 −1.04
Gender (Male=1, Female=2) 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09
Highest education
Junior highschool −0.27 −0.68 −0.13 0.35
Highschool 0.39 −0.47 0.46 0.57
Vocational school −1.21 −0.12 0.44 −0.39
Two-year college −0.44 0.47 −0.09 0.85
College 1.27 0.43 −0.20 −1.00
Graduate school −1.09 −0.43 −0.85 0.09
Four point scale variables about voter preferences
Preferred party or candidate 0.14 −0.27 −0.32 −0.28
LDP is a preferred party −0.77 0.26 0.24 0.39
DPJ is a preferred party −0.24 0.90 −0.30 −0.18
Komeito is a preferred party −0.21 0.64 0.77 0.50
JCP is a preferred party −0.27 1.00 −0.30 0.83
SDP is a preferred party 0.37 1.23 −0.78 −0.46
Planning to vote −0.08 −0.08 0.02 0.02
Proportional representation: Planning to vote for
LDP 0.24 0.49 −1.31 −0.79
DPJ −0.08 −1.16 −0.14 −0.70
Komeito 0.35 0.32 0.61 0.87
JCP 0.93 1.57 0.81 0.46
SDP −0.26 −0.95 0.36 0.66
other party −1.23 0.19 0.75 0.83
Conﬁdence (4 point scale) −0.60 0.04 0.19 0.17
Electoral district: Planning to vote for
LDP candidate 0.99 0.89 −1.35 −0.06
DPJ candidate −0.22 −0.46 −0.08 −0.46
Komeito candidate −0.62 −0.29 0.15 −0.51
JCP candidate 0.11 0.66 0.64 −0.85
SDP candidate −1.49 −1.80 −0.34 −1.08
Independent candidate −0.70 −0.31 0.38 1.29
Other candidate 1.66 0.80 1.81 1.35
Conﬁdence (4 point scale) 0.68 0.08 0.20 0.44
Not planning to vote 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.17
Undecided 0.04 0.04 −0.17 −0.17
Table 4: Overall Balance of Pretreatment Variables Across Randomized Blocks. The ﬁgures
represent t-statistics for all pre-treatment covariates comparing each treatment group with the
control group.
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Summary of Posterior Distributions
mean s.d. 2.5% 97.5%
Compliance Model Parameters
Intercept for Block I 0.945 1.061 −1.173 2.995
Intercept for Block II 0.824 1.065 −1.296 2.894
Intercept for Block III 1.040 1.079 −1.112 3.138
Intercept for Block IV 0.709 1.060 −1.403 2.766
Intercept for Block V 0.422 1.076 −1.725 2.514
Intercept for Block VI 0.924 1.072 −1.208 3.010
Age −0.001 0.006 −0.013 0.011
Highest education completed: college or above 0.019 0.118 −0.212 0.251
Knew which party to vote for 0.169 0.131 −0.088 0.428
LDP is a preferred party −0.036 0.134 −0.298 0.225
DPJ is a preferred party 0.009 0.141 −0.270 0.284
New Ko¯meito¯ is a preferred party 0.092 0.160 −0.223 0.405
JCP is a preferred party −0.280 0.164 −0.604 0.041
SDP is a preferred party 0.172 0.168 −0.155 0.503
Aggregate turnout in 2001 −0.005 0.017 −0.039 0.029
Outcome Model Parameters
Compliers with treatment −0.184 0.182 −0.543 0.172
Compliers without treatment −0.380 0.261 −0.887 0.139
Intercept for Block I −0.124 1.118 −2.327 2.038
Intercept for Block II −0.442 1.109 −2.628 1.709
Intercept for Block III −2.112 1.124 −4.330 0.060
Intercept for Block IV −2.114 1.117 −4.314 0.045
Intercept for Block V −1.438 1.112 −3.618 0.709
Intercept for Block VI −1.355 1.117 −3.549 0.805
Age 0.024 0.007 0.011 0.037
Highest education completed: college or above 0.033 0.120 −0.202 0.269
Knew which party to vote for 0.554 0.146 0.267 0.838
LDP is a preferred party −0.192 0.136 −0.461 0.072
DPJ is a preferred party 0.157 0.147 −0.133 0.447
New Ko¯meito¯ is a preferred party −0.108 0.162 −0.422 0.213
JCP is a preferred party −0.204 0.170 −0.541 0.127
SDP is a preferred party 0.205 0.173 −0.129 0.543
Aggregate turnout in 2001 0.010 0.018 −0.025 0.045
Table 5: Posterior Summaries for Each of the Estimated Parameters in the Two-Party Eﬀect
Model. The columns show the mean, standard deviation, and 95 percent credible interval of the
posterior distributions.
33
References
Achen, C. H. and Bartels, L. M. (2004). Musical chairs: Pocketbook voting and the limits of
democratic accountability. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Chicago, September, 2004.
Alvarez, R. M. (1998). Information and Elections: Revised to Include the 1996 Presidential
Election. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Angrist, J. D. (1990). Lifetime earnings and the V ietnam era draft lottery: Evidence from social
security administrative records. American Economic Review 80, 313–336.
Angrist, J. D., Imbens, G. W., and Rubin, D. B. (1996). Identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects using
instrumental variables (with discussion). Journal of the American Statistical Association 91,
444–455.
Ansolabehere, S. and Iyengar, S. (1995). Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink
and Polarize the Electorate. Free Press, New York, NY.
Ansolabehere, S., Iyengar, S., Simon, A., and Valentino, N. (1994). Does attack advertising
demobilize the electorate? American Political Science Review 88, 4, 829–838.
Barnard, J., Frangakis, C. E., Hill, J. L., and Rubin, D. B. (2003). Principal stratiﬁcation approach
to broken randomized experiments: A case study of school choice vouchers in New York (with
discussion). Journal of the American Statistical Association 98, 462, 299–311.
Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformed votes: Information eﬀects in presidential elections. American
Journal of Political Science 40, 1, 194–230.
Berelson, B., Lazarsfeld, P. F., and McPhee, W. N. (1954). Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation
in A Presidential Campaign. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Blais, A. (2000). To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory.
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA.
34
Brody, R. A. and Page, B. I. (1972). Comment: The assessment of policy voting. American
Political Science Review 66, 2, 450–458.
Burden, B. C. (2000). Voter turnout and the national election studies. Political Analysis 8, 4,
389–398.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American Voter.
John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
Conover, P. J. and Feldman, S. (1989). Candidate perception in an ambiguous world: Campaigns,
cues, and inference processes. American Journal of Political Science 33, 4, 912–940.
Cox, D. R. (1958). Planning of Experiments. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Cox, D. R. and Reid, N. (2000). The Theory of the Design of Experiments. Chapman & Hall,
New York.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. HarperCollins, New York, NY.
Dulio, D. A., Goﬀ, D. L., and Thurber, J. A. (1999). Untangled web: Internet use during the 1998
election. PS: Political Science and Politics 32, 1, 53–59.
Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1996). The swing voter’s curse. American Economic Review
86, 3, 408–424.
Feddersen, T. and Pesendorfer, W. (1999). Abstention in elections with asymmetric information
and diverse preferences. American Political Science Review 93, 2, 381–398.
Feddersen, T. J. (2004). Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 18, 1, 99–102.
Ferejohn, J. A. and Kuklinski, J. H., eds. (1990). Information and Democratic Processes. Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, IL.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale University Press,
New Haven, CT.
35
Frangakis, C. E. and Rubin, D. B. (1999). Addressing complications of intention-to-treat anal-
ysis in the combined presence of all-or-none treatment-noncompliance and subsequent missing
outcomes. Biometrika 86, 365–379.
Frangakis, C. E. and Rubin, D. B. (2002). Principal stratiﬁcation in causal inference. Biometrics
58, 21–29.
Frangakis, C. E., Rubin, D. B., and Zhou, X.-H. (2002). Clustered encouragement designs with
individual noncompliance: Bayesian inference with randomization, and application to advance
directive forms (with discussion). Biostatistics 3, 147–164.
Gerber, A. S. and Green, D. P. (2000). The eﬀects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail
on voter turnout: A ﬁeld experiment. American Political Science Review 94, 653–663.
Ghirardato, P. and Katz, J. N. (2002). Indecision theory: Quality of information and voting
behavior. Social Science Working Paper 1106R, California Institute of Technology.
Gibson, R., Nixon, P., and Ward, S., eds. (2003a). Political Parties and the Internet: Net Gain?
Routledge, London.
Gibson, R. K., Margolis, M., Resnick, D., and Ward, S. J. (2003b). Election campaigning on the
WWW in the USA and UK: A comparative analysis. Party Politics 9, 1, 47–75.
Greevy, R., Lu, B., Silber, J. H., and Rosenbaum, P. (2004). Optimal multivariate matching before
randomization. Biostatistics 5, 263–275.
Grofman, B. (1983). Models of voter turnout: A brief idiosyncratic view. Public Choice 41, 55–61.
Grofman, B., ed. (1993). Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democ-
racy in Perspective. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Harrison, G. W. and List, J. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature XLII,
1009–1055.
Hill, J., Rubin, D. B., and Thomas, N. (1999). Research Designs: Inspired by the Work of Donald
Campbell (eds. L. Bickman), chap. The Design of the New York School Choice Scholarship
Program Evaluation, 155–180. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
36
Hirano, K., Imbens, G. W., Rubin, D. B., and Zhou, X.-H. (2000). Assessing the eﬀect of an
inﬂuenza vaccine in an encouragement design. Biostatistics 1, 69–88.
Ho, D. E. and Imai, K. (2004). The impact of partisan electoral regulation: Ballot eﬀects from
the California alphabet lottery, 1978–2002. Submitted to Journal of Law, Economics, and Or-
ganization available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kimai/research/alphabet.html.
Ho, D. E. and Imai, K. (2005). Randomization inference with natural experiments: An analysis of
ballot eﬀects in the 2003 california recall election. In revision for Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kimai/research/fisher.html.
Holland, P. W. (1986). Statistics and causal inference (with discussion). Journal of the American
Statistical Association 81, 945–960.
Horiuchi, Y. (2002). Turnout decline in japan during the 1990s: Did voters lose interests and faith
in politics? Presentated at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, August–September, 2002.
Huckfeldt, R. R. and Sprague, J. (1995). Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Informa-
tion and Inﬂuence in An Election Campaign. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Imai, K. (2005). Do get-out-the-vote calls reduce turnout?: The importance of statistical methods
for ﬁeld experiments. American Political Science Review to appear. available at http://www.
princeton.edu/~kimai/research/files/matching.pdf.
Imai, K. and van Dyk, D. A. (2004). Causal inference with general treatment regimes: Generalizing
the propensity score. Journal of the American Statistical Association, Theory and Methods 99,
467, 854–866.
Imai, K. and van Dyk, D. A. (2005). A Bayesian analysis of the multinomial probit model using
marginal data augmentation. Journal of Econometrics 124, 2, 311–334.
Imbens, G. W. (2004). Nonparametric estimation of average treatment eﬀects under exogeneity:
A review. Review of Economics and Statistics 86, 1, 4–29.
37
Imbens, G. W. and Rubin, D. B. (1997). Bayesian inference for causal eﬀects in randomized
experiments with noncompliance. Annals of Statistics 25, 305–327.
Iyengar, S. and Jackman, S. (2003). Can information technology energize voters? experimental
evidence from the 2000 and 2002 campaigns. Presentated at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August, 2003.
Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D. R. (1987). News That Matters: Television and American Opinion.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Johnson, T. J. and Kaye, B. K. (2003). A boost or bust for democracy?: How the web inﬂu-
enced political attitudes and behaviors in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics 8, 3, 9–34.
Key, V. O. (1966). The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960.
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Kinder, D. R. and Palfrey, T. R., eds. (1993). Experimental Foundations of Political Science.
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Krosnick, J. (1988). The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: A study of policy
preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 55, 2, 196–210.
Lassen, D. D. (2005). The eﬀect of information on voter turnout: Evidence from a natural
experiment. American Journal of Political Science 49, 1, 103–118.
Lippmann, W. (1922). Public Opinion. Macmillan, New York, NY.
Lupia, A. (1994). Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting behavior in california
insurance reform elections. American Political Science Review 88, 1, 63–76.
Lupia, A. and Philpot, T. S. (Nd). Views from inside the net: How websites aﬀect young adults’s
political interest. Journal of Politics Forthcoming.
38
Luskin, R. C. (1987). Measuring political sophistication. American Journal of Political Science
31, 4, 856–899.
Markus, G. B. and Converse, P. E. (1979). A dynamic simultaneous equation model of electoral
choice. American Political Science Review 73, 4, 1055–1070.
Matsusaka, J. G. (1995). Explaining voter turnout patterns: An information theory. Public Choice
84, 1–2, 91–117.
McDermott, M. L. (1997). Voting cues in low-information elections: Candidate gender as a social
information variable in contemporary United States elections. American Journal of Political
Science 41, 1, 270–283.
McDermott, M. L. (2005). Candidate occupations and voter information shortcuts. Journal of
Politics 67, 1, 201–219.
McDermott, R. (2002). Experimental methods in political science. Annual Review of Political
Science 5, 31–61.
Merrill, S., Grofman, B., and Adams, J. (2001). Assimilation and contrast eﬀects in voter pro-
jections of party locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and the USA. European Journal of
Political Research 40, 2, 199–223.
Palfrey, T. R. and Poole, K. T. (1987). The relationship between information, ideology, and voting
behavior. American Journal of Political Science 31, 3, 511–530.
Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H. (1985). Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. American
Political Science Review 79, 1, 62–78.
Popkin, S. L. (1991). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential
Campaigns. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Popkin, S. L. (1993). Information shortcuts and reasoning voter. In B. Grofman, ed., Information,
Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective, 17–35. University
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
39
RePass, D. E. (1971). Issue salience and party choice. American Political Science Review 65, 2,
389–400.
Rosenstone, S. J. and Hansen, J. M. (1993). Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in
America. Macmillan, New York, NY.
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal eﬀects of treatments in randomized and non-randomized
studies. Journal of Educational Psychology 66, 688–701.
Rubin, D. B. (1990). Comments on “On the application of probability theory to agricultural
experiments. Essay on principles. Section 9” by J. Splawa-Neyman translated from the Polish
and edited by D. M. Dabrowska and T. P. Speed. Statistical Science 5, 472–480.
Sigelman, C. K., Sigelman, L., Walkosz, B. J., and Nitz, M. (1995). Black candidates, white voters:
Understanding racial bias in political perceptions. American Journal of Political Science 39, 1,
243–265.
Silver, B. D., Anderson, B. A., and Abramson, P. R. (1986). Who overreports voting? American
Political Science Review 80, 2, 613–624.
Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., Siegel, J. W., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (1982). Evaluative bias
and issue proximity. Political Behavior 4, 2, 115–131.
Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a ﬁeld experiment in
Benin. World Politics 55, 399–422.
Weber, L. M., Loumakis, A., and Bergman, J. (2003). Who participates and why?: An analysis
of citizens on the Internet and the mass public. Social Science Computer Review 21, 1, 26–42.
Wolﬁnger, R. E. and Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). Who Votes? Yale University Press, New Haven,
CT.
Zaller, J. R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press, New
York, NY.
40
